Date: November 18th, Thurs. 17:15-18:45
Speaker: Mr Takeshi Osada (Saitama University)
Co-Author: Mr Vera R. David (California State University) , Mr Taketoshi Hashimoto (Bank of Japan)
Title: Personal Network, Board Structure and Corporate Fraud in Japan
(Abstract)
We examine the role of corporate governance indicators and personal network indicators as possible
explanatory variables to the occurrence and detection of fraud. We rely on novel data on the occurrence and
detection of corporate frauds of Japanese listed companies to estimate panel-Logit and Cox Proportional-Hazard
models of fraud occurrence and detection respectively. This study has three unique characteristics: we focus on
the two different stages of corporate fraud: “occurrence” and “detection (concealment)”. Second, we focus on the
unique Japanese personal network: alma mater. Third, using 26 different indicators of corporate governance, we
examine the impact of “Corporate Governance Reform” implemented by the Japanese government in recent years.
Our results are as follows: Recent changes in corporate governance reform in Japan have shown to be generally
meaningful in terms of accelerating detection of (preventing the concealment of) fraud. On the other hand, the
results show that corporate governance reform is not necessarily meaningful for the “occurrence” of fraud. These
results suggest that occurrence and detection of fraud occur through different mechanisms, and that corporate
governance to prevent occurrence of fraud may differ from that to prevent concealment of fraud. The results on
the personal network show that the stronger the personal network among board members, the more likely the
occurrence of fraud is prevented. In addition, we show that the network of universities from which board members
graduated could prevent fraud concealment. A board of directors with a strong personal network had the potential
to mitigate information asymmetry and prevent fraud occurrence and concealment compared with a board of
directors without a strong personal network. This result contrasts with previous findings from Europe and the
United States that have empirically demonstrated the negative effect of personal networks on fraud (Strong
personal networks reduce expected costs of corporate fraud and increase fraud probability), and implies that the
impact of personal networks on corporate fraud may differ among countries, societies, and cultures.
