日時：2026年7月9日（木）17:15〜18:45
場所：マーキュリータワー4階3403室（経営管理研究科ミーティングルーム）
報告者：北川梨津氏（Columbia University)
タイトル：Stock Exchanges as Governance Institutions: Evidence from the Tokyo Stock Exchange
タイトル：Stock Exchanges as Governance Institutions: Evidence from the Tokyo Stock Exchange
(Abstract)
In March 2023, the Tokyo Stock Exchange requested, without formal enforcement, that listed firms disclose action plans to improve their cost of capital and profitability. We evaluate the effects of this disclosure request using a staggered difference-in-differences design. Our estimates show that disclosed firms experience modest short-run increases in valuation, higher profitability, and more shareholder-friendly payout and capital policies. These effects are stronger and more persistent among higher-valuation and higher-tier firms. Exploiting the exchange’s emphasis on firms with price-to-book ratios below one, we also conduct a regression discontinuity analysis. Contrary to expectations, firms just below the threshold are initially less likely to disclose than those just
above it, and that marginal disclosers just above the cutoff subsequently trade at lower price-to-book ratios. Collectively, our findings suggest that exchange-driven governance initiatives without formal enforcement can be effective on average, but can also depress valuations for firms induced to comply at the margin.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Disclosure, Stock Exchange
JEL Codes: G14, G3 8, M41
above it, and that marginal disclosers just above the cutoff subsequently trade at lower price-to-book ratios. Collectively, our findings suggest that exchange-driven governance initiatives without formal enforcement can be effective on average, but can also depress valuations for firms induced to comply at the margin.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Disclosure, Stock Exchange
JEL Codes: G14, G3 8, M41
