第10回金融研究会を開催しました。

（論文要旨）

Partial conversion of contingent capital (CC) provides its owners with a portfolio of equity and debt. Since the cash- ow rights on equity (debt) typically induce a preference for risk (safety), the net preference of CC-holders upon conversion will depend on their relative holdings of each asset, which in turn, depends on the amount of CC converted. Conversions also provide CC-holders with equity-control rights, which afford them greater in uence over management. Taking into account these cash- ow/control rights, initial shareholders may find it optimal to: 1) select high-risk assets that create in uential and risk-loving CC-holders, or 2) select low-risk assets that forestall the influence of safety-loving CC-holders.

Keywords:Contingent Capital, Bank Regulation, Corporate Governance.
JEL classification:G21, G28, G34.